From Mass Torts to Wage Claims: How Bristol-Myers Is Reshaping FLSA Collective Actions 

In 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), which reshaped how courts evaluate personal jurisdiction—particularly in multi-state litigation. The case involved a group of out-of-state plaintiffs who joined a mass tort action in California state court, alleging injuries from a pharmaceutical drug. Grounding its reasoning in due process principles, the Court held that state courts lack specific personal jurisdiction over mass tort claims by non-resident plaintiffs when those claims have no meaningful connection to the forum state. 

 

Before Bristol-Myers, plaintiffs often took for granted that Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claims could be brought on a nationwide basis, with little concern for where employers operated or where opt-in plaintiffs worked. Courts routinely allowed these collective actions to proceed without scrutinizing personal jurisdiction over out-of-state claims. 

 

That changed in the wake of Bristol-Myers, and the shift was on full display in Schiller-Egles v. PromptCare Companies, Inc., 2025 WL 904331 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2025). There, Judge Kenneth M. Karas became the latest federal judge to invoke Bristol-Myers to limit the availability of nationwide FLSA collective action litigation. 

 

In Schiller-Egles, the named plaintiff filed suit under the FLSA, alleging unpaid wages and improper pay practices. Several out-of-state employees opted into the litigation.  The defendant, PromptCare, moved to dismiss the out-of-state claims, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction. Judge Karas agreed. 

 

Citing Bristol-Myers, the court reasoned that because these opt-in plaintiffs did not live or work in New York, were not hired there, and experienced the alleged wage violations outside the state, their claims did not arise from any in-forum conduct by PromptCare. Accordingly, the court held it could not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state claims. Moreover, PromptCare was not “at home” in New York—it is neither incorporated nor headquartered there—so the court could not exercise general jurisdiction either. As in Bristol-Myers, the court held that just because there is jurisdiction over in-state claims, it does not follow that there is jurisdiction over out-of-state claims.

 

Schiller-Egles is part of a growing trend among district courts and some appellate courts that have applied Bristol-Myers to FLSA cases. The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have embraced the Supreme Court’s logic, holding that out-of-state opt-in plaintiffs must demonstrate a forum-specific link between their claims and the defendant’s conduct. The First Circuit, on the other hand, held that so long as the named plaintiff properly serves the defendant, there is personal jurisdiction over both in-state and out-of-state opt-in plaintiffs. The Second Circuit has yet to rule on the issue. 

 

The FLSA was designed to allow collective enforcement of federal wage laws, and its opt-in mechanism is a key tool for plaintiffs to pool claims efficiently. But as Schiller-Egles illustrates, personal jurisdiction may increasingly limit the statute’s reach.  

 

For employers, the decision offers a potentially powerful procedural defense. A nationwide FLSA collective action filed in a state where the employer has limited ties may now be open to jurisdictional challenge—potentially narrowing the scope of litigation dramatically. For employees and plaintiff-side attorneys, venue selection and factual nexus to the forum are now critical strategic considerations.